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SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AS A TWO-
WAY STREET 
HOW THE COURT CAN RECONCILE SAME-
SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 
Mark L. Rienzi* 
INTRODUCTION 
Last month, the potential conflict between same-sex marriage and religious 
liberty prompted death threats, arson threats, and the temporary closure of a 
small-town pizzeria in Indiana. The restaurant’s owner had admitted to a re-
porter that she could not cater a hypothetical same-sex wedding because of her 
religious beliefs (even though she otherwise serves gay customers in her restau-
rant).1 Threatened with violence over her unpopular religious belief, the owner 
was forced to close the restaurant, uncertain if she could ever reopen.2   
Leading up to oral argument in the same-sex marriage cases, it was reason-
able to wonder whether the Indiana episode was evidence of an irreconcilable 
conflict between same-sex marriage and religious liberty. If so, then a Supreme 
Court decision in favor of same-sex marriage might leave no room for religious 
diversity of opinion about marriage. As a result, individuals, businesses, 
churches, and other religious organizations could face a world in which having 
unpopular beliefs about marriage would trigger a range of punishments. 
The argument did little to dispel that concern. When Chief Justice Roberts 
asked whether religious schools would be required to give same-sex couples 
married student housing, Solicitor General Donald Verrilli, Jr. suggested that 
 
 * Associate Professor, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of 
Law; Senior Counsel, the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty. The views expressed here are 
my own.  
 1.  See Alyssa Marino, RFRA: Michiana Business Wouldn’t Cater a Gay Wedding, 
ABC 57 NEWS (Apr. 1, 2015, 4:37 AM PDT), http://www.abc57.com/story/28681598/rfra 
-first-business-to-publicly-deny-same-sex-service.  
 2.  Caitlin Dewey, A Call for Sanity in the Matter of Memories Pizza vs. the Internet, 
WASH. POST INTERSECT (Apr. 2, 2015), http://wpo.st/SKjF0. The pizzeria has since reopened. 
Tom Coyne, Northern Indiana Pizzeria That Backed Religious Law Reopens, WASH. POST 
(Apr. 9, 2015), http://wpo.st/vKjF0. 
May 2015] SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 19 
they might.3 Solicitor General Verrilli also candidly acknowledged the possibil-
ity that the Internal Revenue Service would take away tax-exempt status from 
religious non-profits opposed to same-sex marriage, saying “it’s certainly going 
to be an issue.”4 
It need not be an issue, or at least not as much of an issue as the Indiana ep-
isode and the Solicitor General’s responses suggest. There is no inherent con-
flict between same-sex marriage and religious diversity. As with most other is-
sues, our society remains capable of adopting a live-and-let-live approach in 
which same-sex marriage is recognized as a constitutional right, but religious 
dissenters are neither punished for their beliefs nor forced to violate them.5  
Whether we follow that course may depend in part on how the Supreme 
Court recognizes same-sex marriage if it decides to do so. An Equal Protection 
decision that paints all opposition to same-sex marriage as anti-gay animus 
might fuel the notion that religious diversity on the issue is a problem for the 
government to eradicate.6 But the Court might defuse the potential conflict if it 
uses its substantive due process precedents to recognize same-sex marriage as a 
deeply personal and important question, worthy of protection under precedents 
such as Planned Parenthood v. Casey7 and Lawrence v. Texas.8  
The key to such a ruling would be for the Court to make clear what has 
long been implicit in its substantive due process decisions: namely, that sub-
stantive due process is a two-way street. When the Court recognizes a right be-
cause it is deeply personal and important, governments are not free to force 
unwilling parties to participate in or support the exercise of that right. Rights 
created because they relate to deeply important issues that are “central to per-
sonal dignity”—and about which the Court believes people should be able to 
 
 3.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 36-37, Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556 (U.S. 
Apr. 28, 2015), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument 
_transcripts/14-556q1_7l48.pdf. 
 4.  Id. at 38. 
 5.  Indeed, this live-and-let-live approach is our constitutional norm. It is constitu-
tional to procure an abortion, a gun, a Bible, or pornography; to engage in all manner of reli-
gious and secular ceremonies; and for the government to engage in capital punishment and 
wage war. Yet we generally do not force unwilling parties to participate in these legal and 
constitutionally protected or constitutionally permitted activities when it runs contrary to 
their deeply held moral or religious beliefs. See generally Mark L. Rienzi, The Constitutional 
Right Not to Kill, 62 EMORY L.J. 121, 130-52 (2012) (describing widespread conscience pro-
tections related to military service, capital punishment, assisted suicide, and abortion). 
 6.  See, e.g., Brief of Douglas Laycock et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petition-
ers at 26-27, Obergefell, No. 14-556 (U.S. Mar. 6, 2015), 2015 WL 1048450 (“Religious 
colleges, summer camps, day care centers, retreat houses, counseling centers, meeting halls, 
and adoption agencies may be sued under public accommodations laws for refusing to offer 
their facilities or services to same-sex couples. Or they may be penalized by loss of licens-
ing, accreditation, government contracts, access to public facilities, or tax exemption.” (foot-
notes omitted)). 
 7.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 8.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 588 (2003). 
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make their own decisions without “compulsion of the State”9—necessarily also 
preclude government compulsion against people who choose not to participate 
in or support the exercise of those rights.10 Articulating this even-handed un-
derstanding of substantive due process rights in the marriage context could go a 
long way toward helping the nation reconcile same-sex marriage and religious 
liberty. 
I. THE ABORTION ROADMAP 
The Court’s abortion decisions have, of course, generated considerable 
controversy. There is, however, an uncontroversial aspect of those decisions 
that may be useful in the marriage context. In particular, the abortion decisions 
take seriously the religious and moral concerns of those who cannot participate 
in or support abortion. The abortion decisions both recognize a substantive con-
stitutional right to abortion and acknowledge the diversity of opinion on the 
subject and the appropriateness of protecting dissenters from forced participa-
tion or support. In this respect, the abortion decisions offer a potential roadmap 
for a same-sex marriage decision.  
Roe v. Wade actually begins with an acknowledgement of the “sensitive 
and emotional nature of the abortion controversy.”11 The opinion then relies on 
Justice Holmes’s observation that the Constitution “is made for people of fun-
damentally differing views”12 and later notes “the wide divergence of thinking” 
on the “difficult question of when life begins.”13 The Court further noted its 
own incompetence to dictate the answer to such a question and cautioned that 
“by adopting one theory of life,” the State of Texas could not “override the 
rights” of pregnant women who disagree with the State.14 And the Court ex-
pressly located the right to abortion not just with the woman seeking the abor-
tion, but also with the physician, who remains free to exercise her own medical 
judgment about whether to provide it.15   
In Doe v. Bolton,16 the companion case to Roe, the Court spoke approving-
ly of Georgia’s statutory protection for individuals and organizations that did 
not freely choose to participate in or support abortion. For example, the Court 
noted the individuals who would be involved in an abortion—namely “a physi-
 
 9.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. 
 10.  This argument has been set forth in more detail elsewhere in relation to abortion. 
See Rienzi, supra note 5, at 147-52. See generally Mark Rienzi, The Constitutional Right Not 
to Participate in Abortions: Roe, Casey, and the Fourteenth Amendment Rights of 
Healthcare Providers, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2011). 
 11.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973). 
 12.  Id. at 117 (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting)).  
 13.  Id. at 159-60. 
 14.  Id. at 162.  
 15.  Id. at 163.  
 16.  410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
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cian or any other employee”—have “the right to refrain, for moral and religious 
reasons.”17 The hospital itself is “free not to admit a patient for an abortion.”18 
The Court characterized these rights as “appropriate protection[s]” both for in-
dividuals and organizations asked to participate in or support abortions.19 
Casey continues this approach by emphasizing the importance of the abor-
tion decision both to the woman seeking the abortion and to those asked to par-
ticipate. The plurality opinion emphasizes that abortion is a deeply personal 
choice, implicating “one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the uni-
verse, and of the mystery of human life.”20 For this reason, being able to make 
one’s own decisions about abortion, whatever the conclusion, is “central to per-
sonal dignity” and helps “define the attributes of personhood.”21 Such decisions 
must be made without “compulsion of the State.”22 Abortion is “fraught with 
consequences”—and not simply for the woman seeking the abortion.23 Rather, 
the Court recognized that abortion is also “fraught with consequences for oth-
ers,” including “the persons who perform and assist in the procedure.”24  
The Court’s recognition of an abortion right in Roe, Doe, and Casey 
prompted most states and the federal government to institute conscience protec-
tions for people who do not wish to participate in or support abortion.25 These 
protections tend to be broad—protecting people not only from being forced to 
perform abortions, but also from being forced to assist in the performance of an 
abortion, from being forced to have one’s property used in the performance of 
an abortion, or even from bring forced to refer a request for an abortion to an-
other provider.26 Perhaps because of these protections, the Court has devoted 
 
 17.  Id. at 197-98. 
 18.  Id. at 197. 
 19.  Id. at 198. Several years after Roe and Doe, the Court also made clear that the 
abortion right does not include the ability to force an unwilling government to pay for one’s 
abortion. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980). Rather, Roe left even governments 
free to make their own “value judgment[s]” about whether to participate in or support abor-
tions. Id. at 314 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)). 
 20.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id.  
 23.  Id. at 852.  
 24.  Id. (emphasis added). A majority of the Court later adopted the Casey Court’s ex-
plication of liberty in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003). 
 25.  See Rienzi, supra note 10, at 31-35 (noting the “speed and near ubiquity” of con-
science protections adopted at the state and federal levels in the wake of Roe). 
 26.  Id. at 34 (“These protections extended not only to direct personal performance of 
an abortion, but more broadly to providers who have an objection to being forced to ‘partici-
pate,’ ‘refer,’ ‘assist,’ ‘arrange for,’ ‘admit any patient for,’ ‘allow the use of hospital facili-
ties for,’ ‘accommodate,’ or ‘advise’ concerning abortion.”). In this sense, our experience 
with abortion matches our approach to other important issues over which our citizens have 
deep moral or religious disagreements, such as capital punishment, assisted suicide, and 
military combat. Rienzi, supra note 5, at 135-47. 
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very little of its abortion jurisprudence to disputes over forced participation or 
support for abortion.27 
II. DEFINING THE “LIBERTY OF ALL” 
The abortion cases demonstrate the Court’s ability to recognize a new con-
stitutional right under substantive due process while at the same time acknowl-
edging the propriety of protecting dissenters from forced participation in the 
exercise of that right. The Court has not yet acknowledged what those cases 
teach about substantive due process rights: that they are two-way streets.28 In 
other words, even if legislatures had not adopted broad statutory protections in 
the abortion context, the Fourteenth Amendment would forbid governments 
from forcing unwilling individuals and organizations to participate in or sup-
port abortion.29  
The same-sex marriage cases provide an important opportunity for the 
Court to explicitly acknowledge this even-handed aspect of substantive due 
process. Where an issue is so deeply important that citizens must be able to 
reach their own conclusions without the “compulsion of the State,” the same 
Fourteenth Amendment that protects the decision to exercise the right simulta-
neously protects the decision not to participate in or support the exercise of the 
right.  
Acknowledging this two-sided nature of substantive due process rights 
would be consistent with the Court’s view of its obligation in such cases to “de-
fine the liberty of all,” rather than to mandate a single “moral code” that all cit-
izens must follow.30 The Court should make clear that, just as neither it nor the 
State of Texas could dictate the answer to the question of life’s beginnings and 
thereby “override the rights” of dissenting pregnant women by “adopting one 
theory of life,” neither the Court nor the States can override the rights of reli-
gious dissenters by enforcing one theory of marriage.31 As the Court explained 
in Casey, while governments are generally free to “adopt one position or the 
other” on a disputed question, that principle must yield where the choice treads 
 
 27.  Indeed, the closest the Court has come to the issue in the four decades since Roe 
appears to be the recent spate of cases concerning the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices (HHS) contraceptive mandate. See, e.g., Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged 
v. Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 1022 (2014). Disclosure: I represent the Little Sisters of the Poor 
Home for the Aged and several other parties challenging the contraceptive mandate. 
 28.  See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell & Nathan Chapman, A Step Backward for Free-
dom of Conscience, HOOVER INSTITUTION (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.hoover.org/research 
/step-backward-freedom-conscience (“[Roe’s] privacy rationale implies a broad freedom of 
conscience for relevant health care workers.”). 
 29.  See generally Rienzi, supra note 5, at 127-30 (describing widespread and broadly 
agreed-upon conscience protections and explaining how the Fourteenth Amendment protects 
conscience rights).  
 30.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992). 
 31.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973). 
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upon a “protected liberty.”32 In explaining this aspect of substantive due pro-
cess, the Court invoked its First Amendment precedent in West Virginia State 
Board of Education v. Barnette: “Thus, while some people might disagree 
about whether or not the flag should be saluted, or disagree about the proposi-
tion that it may not be defiled, [the Court has] ruled that a State may not com-
pel or enforce one view or the other.”33  
The same is true in the marriage context. Parties on all sides emphasize the 
importance of marriage as, for example, “an institution of profound emotional 
and cultural significance”34 and of “fundamental importance.”35 For millions of 
Americans, marriage is also a matter of deep religious significance.36 And the 
Court itself has recognized the importance of marriage as a “sacred” institution 
that “promotes a way of life” and exists “for as noble a purpose as any involved 
in our prior decisions.”37 If the Court recognizes a constitutional right to same-
sex marriage, it should acknowledge that the same characteristics of marriage 
that make it special to people on all sides—its importance, its relationship to 
life’s most profound questions, and its relationship to human dignity—prohibit 
government coercion on either side of the question.  
CONCLUSION 
Substantive due process has long been a controversial doctrine. Perhaps 
ironically, it now provides the Supreme Court’s best opportunity to reduce con-
troversy. By emphasizing that substantive due process protects people on all 
sides of important questions, the Court can demonstrate that same-sex marriage 
and religious liberty need not conflict. And it can make clear that a Constitution 
“made for people of fundamentally differing views”38 actually protects people 
of fundamentally differing views, especially on deeply important issues.39 
 
 32.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. 
 33.  Id. (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)). 
 34.  Brief for Petitioners at 12, Tanco v. Haslam, No. 14-562 (U.S. Feb. 27, 2015) 
(companion case to Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556 (U.S. argued Apr. 28, 2015)), 2015 
WL 860739; see also Brief for Petitioners at 28, Obergefell, No. 14-556 (U.S. Feb. 27, 
2015), 2015 WL 860738 (having one’s marital status recognized “has long been understood 
to be of fundamental importance both to the individual and to society more broadly”). 
 35.  Brief of Respondents at 6, Tanco, No. 14-562 (Mar. 27, 2015), 2015 WL 
1384102. 
 36.  See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of United States Conference of Catholic Bishops in 
Support of Respondents and Supporting Affirmance at 3-5, Obergefell, No. 14-556 (U.S. 
Apr. 2, 2015), 2015 WL 1519042. 
 37.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
 38.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117 (1973) (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 
45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).  
 39.  See W. Va. State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“[The] free-
dom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow 
of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of 
the existing order.”). 
